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1.0

INTRODUCTION

The current liquidity issue and the
inadequate lending to the real sector,
that could result to economic growth
has generated considerable
discussions, while the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) has risen up to these
challenges by ensuring that liquidity in
the banking system is adequate and
that sectoral credit allocation to the
sensitive sectors of the economy
(Agriculture, Power, Aviation and
SMEs) that will impact on the real
sector for growth are handled with all
the attention required.
Moreover, it has been widely reported
that the Central Bank of Nigeria
played a major role in supplying
liquidity to financial markets during
distressed period.
This article
describes the ways in which the CBN
has supplied liquidity since 2009. The
first is traditional: The CBN supplies
liquidity by providing credit through
Open Market Operations (OMO) and
by lending to depository institutions at
the so called discount window. The
second is by enhancing the liquidity of
the banks through the Standing
Lending Facility (SLF) window. This
window is securitized by holding their
securities against the liquidity
supplied to the banks. The Central
Bank of Nigeria has used the second
approach since late 2006. This article
notes that the CBN since after banking
consolidation exercise in 2005 has
departed from its long standing

tradition of minimizing its effect on the
allocation of credit by supplying
liquidity to institutions that it believed
to be most in need; at the same time; it
neutralized the effects of these
actions on the total supply of liquidity
in the financial market. This article
also discusses the CBN's reasons for
reallocating credit to the sector that
will most impact the real sector of the
economy for growth and employment
this time rather than simply increasing
the total supply of financial market
liquidity. This is because monetary
policies have price effects and their
output effect cannot be established in
a direct firm manner if CBN do not
reach out with credit allocation to the
sectors that give fillip to growth. This
article is divided into 5 sections:
Section 1 being the introduction, while
section 2 discusses “What is Liquidity”
concept and definitions. Section 3 will
look at the CBN as a supplier of
market liquidity and how CBN has
allocated credit to the sectors that
impact on the real sector. Section 4
will compare the conventional
monetary policy versus
unconventional monetary policy while
section 5 concludes the article.
2.0

WHAT IS LIQUIDITY

The Word “liquidity” is often used to
describe very different things.
Liquidity is mostly used in the financial
market to describe the characteristics
of an asset. It is the “degree of ease
and certainty of value with which an
asset or security can be converted to
cash”. Liquidity is characterized by a
high level of trading activity. Assets
that can be easily bought or sold, are
known as liquid assets, while the
ability to convert an asset to cash
quickly is known as “market ability”
Cash is pure liquidity. Every other
asset has a degree of liquidity that is
determined by (i) how quickly it can
be converted to cash and (ii) how
much the price of the asset must be
reduced to do so.
The second
requirement originates from the fact
that virtually any asset can be
3

converted to cash quickly if the price is
sufficiently attractive.
The word “liquidity” is also used to
describe the availability of credit in the
financial market. For example, market
analysts or policy makers could
assess the financial market and
indicate that there is a shortage of
liquidity or that the financial market is
“frozen up”. This means that it is
difficult or expensive to obtain a loan or
get credit. Like the liquidity of an
asset, this concept of market liquidity
is relative. Even in the most liquid of
financial markets, some individuals or
firms will be unable to obtain a loan or,
if they do, they will be charged a
relatively high interest rate. Likewise,
many individuals or institutions obtain
credit in markets described as
“illiquid”. No absolute measure of the
liquidity of the financial market exists.
There is also the concept of “liquidity
trap”. This is a Keynesian idea. It is
when expected returns from
investments in securities or real plant
and equipment are low, investment
falls, a recession begins, and cash
holdings in banks rise. People and
businesses then continue to hold cash
because they expect spending and
investment to be low. This is a selffulfilling trap.
An important distinction separates the
concept of market liquidity from the
concept of asset liquidity. By the latter
definition, cash is the quintessence of
liquidity however, “a shortage of
liquidity” in the financial market does
not mean a shortage of cash because
there can never be a shortage of cash.
The CBN has currency management
function to ensure that the quantity of
cash automatically increases to meet
the currency demand through the
process of currency indentation which
is prepared annually in line with the
absorptive capacity and inflation level
in the economy. Consequently, there
can never be a shortage of cash.
When market analysts and policy
makers say that the market has
become less liquid or is illiquid, they
mean that it is more difficult to get a
loan than before; they do not mean
there is a shortage of cash.
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CENTRAL BANK OF
NIGERIA AS A SUPPLIER
OF MARKET LIQUIDITY
AND HOW IT ALLOCATES
CREDIT

Fundamentally, domestic credit has
three major sources: private saving
(individuals and firms), government
saving (surpluses of federal, state and
local governments), and changes in
the monetary base the sum of cash
held by the public and Central Bank of
Nigeria.
The CBN supplies the
market with credit through Open
Market Operations (OMO) and to a
much lesser extent historically,
through loans to depository
institutions at the discount window.
These actions increase the total
supply of credit in the financial market.
The effect of an open market
purchase of securities on the total
supply of credit is exactly the same as
an equal amount of lending at the
discount window. In this case, the
CBN acquires a security in exchange
for funds deposit balances at the
CBN.
Historically, the CBN has conducted
OMO in government and CBN
securities; however, OMO can be
carried out in any asset prescribed by
the CBN Act.
When the CBN
purchase Treasury securities from the
public, it is indirectly making the loan
to the Treasury rather than the public.
Hence, the supply of credit available
to the public increases. Then, if the
CBN sells some of its securities, the
supply of credit available to the public
declines. All things being equal, the
supply of credit in the financial market
increases or decreases, regardless of
whether the change in the monetary
base is due to CBN lending or Open
Market Operations (OMO).
3.1

The CBN And
Allocation Of Credit

The

Although lending by the CBN has
exactly the same effect on the
monetary base as an equivalent Open
Market Operation, the effect of these
actions on the allocation of credit is
different. When the CBN makes a
loan to a depository institution, it
directly allocates credit to that
institution.
The effect on the
allocation of credit is mitigated by the
fact that the total supply of credit
increases the borrowing institutions

obtains credit and no one loses credit.
The effect of CBN lending on the
allocation of credit is intensified when
the CBN offsets the effect of its
lending activity on the total supply of
credit through Open Market
Operations. In this case, borrowing
institution obtains credit but the total
supply of credit is unchanged. In
effect, the borrowing institution is
getting credit at the expense of some
other individual or institution. The
total supply of credit is reallocated.
Historically, the CBN has offset the
effect of discount window lending on
the total supply of credit through Open
Market Operations. However, in the
wave of financial crisis during 2007 to
date, the CBN has encouraged
standing lending facility through the
discount window and all loans to
depository institutions are guaranteed
at the CBN Discount Window. The
practice of offsetting the effect of
discount window lending on this
monetary base means that discount
window lending reallocated credit to
the borrowing institution. The effect of
discount window lending on credit
allocation has not been an issue for
two reasons. First, the initial effect of
an Open Market Operation is on
depository institutions.
Consequently, a discount window
loan to a depository institution that is
o ff s e t t h r o u g h O p e n M a r k e t
Operations has the effect of
reallocating credit among depository
institutions.
Second, and more important,
discount window lending has been
small historically, before 2007 when
the financial crisis created liquidity
crunch on the depository institutions.
This was because CBN has
discouraged depository institutions
from borrowing at the discount
window by charging penal rate.
Depository institutions were expected
to come to the window only when they
had exhausted the relevant
alternative sources of funds. But
what happened was that the
depository institutions refused to lend
to each other because of the
perceived depth of problems of these
institutions.
Moreover those
institutions that borrowed from the
CBN window were perceived as
“troubles”, These problems were
confirmed when in 2009, the CBN had
to do stress tests for the 24 banks and
4

isolated five depository institutions as
very distressed.
These five
depository institutions had
frequented the discount window. The
CBN then gave a life line of about
=N=600 billion to sustain the
depository institutions as a going
concern.
3.2

The CBN New Lending
Facilities and the
Allocation of Credit

In response to the distress in financial
markets associated with the
international financial crisis and the
CBN stress test that showed the
depth of illiquidity in the financial
system; the depository institutions
had not been able to lend to their
customers especially customers in
the real sector. The CBN initiated a
series of new lending program that
supported the quantitative easing
policy. The lending programs were
implemented to ensure “that liquidity
would be distributed to those sectors
that needed it most”; and that
operators in the real sector of the
economy access funds at cheap
rates.
The first among these programs was
the =N=200 billion Commercial
Agricultural Credit Scheme (CACS)
disbursed through the participating
banks. As at April, 2010, four banks,
namely Guaranty Trust Bank Plc; First
Bank of Nigeria Plc; Skye Bank Plc;
and United Bank for Africa Plc
participated under the scheme. The
second program was the =N=200
billion long tenor fund to boost growth
of the Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs). The third program was the
Power Sector =N=500 billion long
tenor fund to support the power sector
improvement. The fourth was the
Aviation sector program of =N=500
billion with each airline to access
=N=1 billion to upgrade their services.
In all these programs, the lending
goes through the depository
institution which abinitio has no
access to long term funds for the real
sector. The CBN funding is a long
tenor fund which brings the fund to the
depository institution's customers at
the Monetary Policy rate.
All other things being equal, these
loans are expected to increase the
monetary base. But the monetary
base was still lower as at end of the
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first half of 2010 from the 2010 second
quarter indicative benchmark of
=N=1,872.00 billion by =N=356.25
billion or 19.02 per cent1. This is
because these loans have no
potential to increase monetary base
as they are essentially an exchange
for less liquid assets of the depository
institution that will on lend to the sector
so specified. What the loans does to
the participating banks was that it only
increase their balance sheet without
increasing the liquidity of the financial
market generally. By doing, these
programs had a significant effect on
the allocation of credit by the CBN.
At the 2010 Institute of International
Finance (IIF) Spring Membership
meeting held during June 9-11, 2010
at Vienna, Austria, Mr. George Soros
canvassed this approach that
regulatory authorities must conduct
sectoral allocation as this helps to
remove bubbles and push growth.
1.0

THE CONVENTIONAL
V
E
R
S
U
S
UNCONVENTIONAL
MONETARY POLICY

The CBN's response to liquidity
concerns is a clear departure from the
conventional tools of monetary policy.
This current development raises two
interesting questions. Why did the
CBN address the liquidity problem by
creating a new array of lending
programs rather than relying on
conventional open market operations
and the discount window? And why
did the CBN decide to reallocate the
total supply of credit rather than
increase the total supply of liquidity in
the financial market.
From the literature, it was obvious that
the lending apathy exhibited by the
Nigerian depository institution could
ground economic growth.
As
indicated by Cechetti (2008), “only
depository institutions have direct
access to the discount window, and
Open Market Operations are
conducted with just a small set of
primary dealers against a narrow
range of highly liquid collateral. In
contrast, in jurisdiction with universal
banking as we have in Nigeria, the
distinction between depository
institutions and other types of financial
institutions is much less relevant in
defining access to central bank
liquidity”.
1

Consequently, the CBN has had to
use methods it does not usually
employ to address liquidity pressures
across a number of markets and
institutions. In effect, the CBN has
had to innovate in large part to
achieve what other Central Banks
have been able to effect through
existing tools.
In Nigeria and because of the
underlying problems of the distress in
the depository institutions, traditional
framework for liquidity provision was
not up to addressing the depth of
liquidity needs of the real sector of the
economy. The CBN was unable to
direct the liquidity to the sector in need
using Open Market Operations.
However, the CBN Act (as amended)
does not prevent the CBN from
purchasing asset backed securities,
commercial paper, and a wide range
of other securities, such as those
taken as collateral against loans
under the new lending programs.
1.1

The Efficacy of the New
Approach

Beside the question of 'why' the CBN
chose this unconventional approach
to monetary policy is the question of
'how' effective it is. Many
macroeconomists believe that
changes in the composition of the
CBN assets that are not accompanied
by a change in the monetary base are
ineffective. This belief is due, in part,
to experience. In the early 1960s the
Federal Reserve Bank of USA
attempted to reduce long term interest
rates while maintaining relatively high
short-term interest rates using a
procedure called “Operation Twist”.
Specifically, the Federal Reserve
Bank bought long-term securities,
while simultaneously selling shortterm securities, so that the net effect
of these transactions on the monetary
base was nil. The rationale was that
by increasing the demand for longterm securities and reducing the
demand for short-term securities, the
Federal Reserve Bank could “twist”
the yield curve long-term rates would
fall relative to short-term rates. Most
analysts concluded that the Federal
Reserve Bank had little or no effect on
the shape of the yield curve.
Operation Twist's failure is consistent
with alternative theories of the term
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structure. For example, the
expectations hypothesis asserts that
long-term rates are determined by the
market's expectation of the future
short-term rate. If short-term rates are
not expected to fall, then long-term
rates will not fall either. The failure of
operation Twist is also consistent with
the risk-premium hypothesis, which
suggests that rates on long-term
securities are generally higher than
rates on short-term securities because
investors demand a risk premium for
investing in longer-term securities
because they have a higher degree of
market risk. The risk premium is
determined by what economists refer
to as “deep structural parameters”
that is, the risk aversion of investors. A
change in the relative demands for
long-term and short-term securities
has no effect on the size of the risk
premium and, hence, no effect on the
shape of the yield curves.
Similar experiences and theoretical
arguments apply when attempts to
alter the exchange rate through
sterilized foreign exchange
intervention is undertaken. Sterilized
foreign exchange intervention occurs
when a central bank purchases
securities denominated in one
country's currency and
simultaneously sells an equal amount
of securities denominated in another
country's currency; so the effect on the
monetary base is nil.
Since December 2009, there has been
some evidence that the first level of
lending program might have had
beneficial effects on financial markets
(Financial Markets review January
2010). This was because before
December 2009, rate spread had
increased as a result of banks' and
other creditors' heightened reluctance
to lend to banks perceived to have an
increased risk of default. Hence, the
rise in the term NIBOR rates and other
rates that reflect the cost of funds to
banks, relative to overnight lending
rates, reflects a risk premium that will
not be reduced by increasing the
liquidity of these banks' portfolios.
2.0

COCNLUSION

In response to the financial crisis and
the “Sanusi Tsunami”, the CBN
instituted a series of new lending to
sectors that could impact the real
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sector of the economy. The lending
increased the liquidity of the
participating banks portfolios without
simultaneously increasing the total
supply of liquidity in the financial
market. By so doing, the CBN
departed significantly from the historic
practice of relying on traditional tools
of Open Market Operations and
discount window lending to provide
liquidity to the real sector of the
economy.
Why the CBN chose to enact a series
of new lending programs rather than

use its existing tools of Open Market
Operations and the discount window
is unclear.
It seems that the
inadequacy of securities for the
market made sectoral lending
approach much more appealing to the
regulatory authority for immediate
impact.
CBN has chosen to
reallocate the credit in the market by
providing loans to the real sector
through the participating banks, while
offsetting the effect of this lending on
total credit through Open Market
Operations. It seems that CBN desire
was not to increase total liquidity in the

economy which could aggravate
inflationary pressure but to provide
liquidity to real sectors through
participating banks to lend for
productive purposes and avoid the
inefficient liquidation of assets that
were temporarily illiquid.
Whatever the reason, it now
appears that CBN has injected
historically large amounts of credit
into the market, which has not
impacted the monetary base. This
may be due to lag in transmission of
the credit to the system.
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